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The Increasing Relevance of Copyright 
Statutory Damages: Some Brief 
Digressions Upon Capitol Records v. 
Thomas 
Sherwin Siy* 
The Thomas case1 has brought two separate copyright 
questions to the fore: the extent of the distribution right2 and the 
extent of statutory damages.  From its inception and through the 
declaration of a mistrial last year, the former question excited a 
great deal of the copyright law blogosphere, and presents a few 
interesting questions for debate; the latter has gained more 
mainstream attention,3 but did not initially raise as much of a 
controversy within the confines of the case itself. 
After all, more was at stake in the interpretation of “making 
available,” since Judge Michael J. Davis chose to order a new trial 
based on flawed jury instructions that equated “making available” 
with the distribution right.4  There are also interesting parallels 
between the distribution right and the right of “making available” 
as articulated in international agreements; there is the continuing 
discussion of whether or how “distribution” is distinct from 
 A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexix/book4.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
* Deputy Legal Director and Kahle/Austin Promise Fellow, Public Knowledge. 
1 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 2 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
 3 See, e.g., Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2007, at C1; Tony Long, Commentary: RIAA Hits a Sour Note With Its File-Sharing 
Witch Hunt, WIRED, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/ 
theluddite/2007/10/luddite_1011; Nilay Patel, RIAA Wins First-ever File-sharing Case to 
Go to Trial, Awarded $222,000, ENGADGET, Oct. 4, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/ 
2007/10/04/riaa-wins-first-ever-file-sharing-case-to-go-to-trial-awarded. 
 4 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226–27. 
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“publication.”5  On the other hand, the statutory damages assessed 
to Jammie Thomas are high, certainly, but clearly within the 
confines set by the statute. 
In terms of effects on copyright policy, though, the question of 
statutory damages will likely be of greater import than questions 
about the making available right.  The issues surrounding the 
distribution right have had their greatest impact on the Thomas 
case because of the particular strategy that the record labels have 
used to find and sue file sharers—relying upon investigators to 
locate copyrighted files that defendants are placing in open shared 
folders without authorization.6  Construing this as a distribution 
allows litigation to proceed without need for any further evidence 
beyond the location of the file in the shared folder, or without 
debating whether or not the investigators’ own downloads 
constitute a distribution by the sharer.7 
However, a less expansive definition of the distribution right 
would not bar litigation: a fact-finder is certainly allowed to make 
reasonable inferences at trial, and in a civil case where the burden 
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, it should not be that 
difficult to prove that a user offering up a shared file to thousands 
of others seeking it would have distributed it at some point.  Nor, 
in most cases, should it be difficult to find that the user had made 
an unauthorized reproduction of the copyrighted work at issue. 
So while there are worthwhile legal controversies surrounding 
the interpretation of distribution that have affected the Thomas 
case and will certainly affect other areas of copyright controversy, 
the end result of interpreting distribution one way or another will 
likely have less practical impact in the long term.8 
 5 See id. at 1219–20, 1225–26 (discussing interplay between “publication” and 
“distribution” and the role of treaty language in the decision, respectively). 
 6 See id. at 1214–16. 
 7 The court in Thomas concluded that the investigator’s downloads would constitute a 
distribution by Thomas. Id. at 1216.  Even assuming distribution was defined more 
narrowly, this would seem to encompass most unauthorized file sharers of copyrighted 
works. 
 8 Indeed, a strategy of mass file sharing lawsuits may soon be rendered obsolete, as 
many labels have found little effect on downloading trends and a large amount of bad 
publicity resulting from them. See, e.g., Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to 
Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1. A large number of cases still 
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However, the singular fact that first made mainstream 
headlines in the Thomas case was the extent of statutory damages.  
Thomas was initially found liable for a total sum of $222,000; a 
matter of $9,250 for each of the twenty-four tracks Thomas 
infringed.9  After the retrial, a new jury awarded plaintiffs $1.92 
million in damages, $80,000 per track infringed.10 The significance 
that the press and public afforded this fact is in line with the 
significant role that large statutory damages play in a wide and 
increasing range of copyright controversies in the digital age.  As 
such, a number of issues surrounding copyright statutory damages 
could benefit from further research and greater scrutiny.11 
As headline-grabbing as even the first award was, it would not 
necessarily have been news to those familiar with the statute.  
Section 504 clearly allows such an award.12  Without a showing of 
actual damages, a plaintiff can be awarded a value between $750 
and $30,000 per work infringed.13  This range can be extended—
innocent infringers may pay out as little as $200 per work 
infringed, whereas willful infringers face a range from $750 up to 
$150,000.14 
Measured in terms of actual damages, Thomas’s infringement 
could be valued at as little as $1 per track (the approximate retail 
value on a download service like iTunes).  Perhaps more 
realistically, the damages could be adjusted upwards to account for 
a number of other factors, including multiple potential sales lost 
proceeding through litigation were apparently initiated before this decision was made. 
See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Nothing to See Here: RIAA Lawsuits Continue, EPICENTER, 
May 6, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/nothing-to-see-here-riaa-
lawsuits-continue. 
 9 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213, 1227–28 (noting, even though beyond the scope 
of the trial court’s review, the “unprecedented and oppressive” amount of damages). 
 10 See, e.g., David Kravets, Jury in RIAA Trial Slaps $2 Million Fine on Jammie 
Thomas, THREAT LEVEL, Jun. 18, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/riaa-
jury-slaps-2-million-fine-on-jammie-thomas. 
 11 One prominent and thorough study is a forthcoming paper by Pamela Samuelson 
and Tara Wheatland released in the past year since the Symposium. Pamela Samuelson & 
Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375604. 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 13 Id. § 504(c)(1). 
 14 Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2). 
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from repeated distributions of the same track.  The minimum that a 
jury could have awarded in statutory damages, however, is $18,000 
total. 
Even leaving aside the simple immensity of this minimum, the 
range of values available to a court in assigning damages 
represents a extraordinary amount of discretion; a range that spans 
over two orders of magnitude.  In a case where thousands of works 
may have been infringed, a court may then decide, in the absence 
of any evidence of actual harm, whether damages should be 
measured in millions or billions of dollars. 
Both the size and the sizable range of copyright statutory 
damages are an outlier compared to other provisions in the U.S. 
Code.  For instance, someone obtaining a consumer report 
fraudulently or for unlawful purposes is liable for actual damages 
or $1000, whichever is greater.15  A federal agency that fails to 
comply with the Privacy Act and thus creates an adverse harm to 
an individual is liable to the individual for at least $1000.16  
Negligently or fraudulently preparing bankruptcy records can 
result in damages of $2000 to a debtor, or twice the amount paid 
by the debtor to the preparer.17  Failing to comply with statutory 
requirements in mortgage loan servicing results in actual damages, 
plus a maximum additional $1000 in cases of a pattern or practice 
of noncompliance.18  In class actions under that same section, 
damages beyond actual damages are capped at $1000 per class 
member, with a maximum additional award equal to either 
$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the defendant.19  
Those harmed by force, threats of force, or physical obstruction in 
seeking access to or provision of reproductive health services may 
sue for statutory damages which are capped at $5000 per 
violation.20  A plaintiff whose communications have been illegally 
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of the Wiretap Act21 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 16 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (2006). 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 110(i)(1)(B) (2006). 
 18 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1) (2006). 
 19 Id. § 2605(f)(2). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1) (2006). 
 21 Id. §§ 2510–2522. 
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can obtain the greater of actual damages or statutory damages in a 
range of $50 to $500 for a first-time offense or $100 to $1000 for 
repeat offenses, with a court able to increase the award to the 
greater of $100 per day of a violation or $10,000.22  Consumers 
harmed by junk faxes or prohibited autodialing are entitled to 
statutory damages of $500 or actual damages, whichever is 
greater.23 
In this admittedly brief, unscientific survey of statutory 
damages provisions, the amounts at issue in copyright 
infringement do seem to occupy an extreme, especially considering 
that these values can be leveled against defendants unquestionably 
less sophisticated than the large and/or regulated entities 
encompassed by some of the larger awards noted above.24 
Given this outlying position in the U.S. Code, it would be a fair 
question to ask if the high values of these damages seem to be 
performing a particularly effective job as a deterrent.  The answer, 
however, coming from two different sides of the copyright debate, 
finds statutory damages ineffective in at least two ways. 
Those who are most concerned that scofflaws be deterred may 
note that in some cases, statutory damages may not be sufficient to 
offset potential profits by large-scale infringers.25  And at the other 
end of the scale, there are other considerations: if low-value 
infringements are not deterred by statutory damages several 
hundred times their actual value, would damages thousands of 
times greater have any appreciable additional deterrent effect?  If 
 22 Id. § 2520(c)–(d). 
 23 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006). 
 24 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 
2008) (“The Court does not condone Thomas’s actions, but it would be a farce to say that 
a single mother’s acts of using Kazaa are the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global 
financial firms illegally infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities 
market.”). 
 25 See, e.g., Sarah A. Zawada, Comment, “Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different 
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on the Deterrence Goal of Copyright 
Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 129, 149–52 (2006) (noting that some infringers 
may profit more from an infringement than statutory damages may cover).  However, it 
should be noted that plaintiffs can choose between actual and statutory damages at any 
time. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
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heightened deterrence effects cannot justify the current size and 
range of statutory damages, what does? 
Doubtless, the range has increased since its inception.  In 1976, 
the range of copyright statutory damages was from $250 to 
$10,000, with innocent infringement minimums of $100, and 
willful set with a maximum of $50,000.26  These values have, 
through amendments in 198827 and in 199928 reached their current 
values.29  Even in the original text of the 1976 Act, however, the 
range still encompassed the same large multiplier range, granting a 
judge or jury incredible latitude in determining a statutorily-set 
penalty. 
Part of the reason for this range of discretion can be found in a 
particular feature of the 1976 Act’s statutory damages regime.  
According to § 504(c)(1), statutory damages are calculated 
according to the number of works infringed, regardless of the 
number of copies, distributions, or performances made in each 
offense.30  Whether a photograph is reproduced in a single piece of 
artwork, or printed in a newspaper with circulation in the 
thousands, only one award will be available within the statutory 
range. 
Nor is the scale or scope of the work infringed considered in 
counting statutory damages.  An infringement of a single sonnet is 
subject to the same range of statutory damages as an infringement 
of a 1400 page novel.31  Given this lack of differentiation, a wide 
range is necessary to account for all of the variations in culpability 
that a single act of infringement can encompass. 
 26 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)). 
 27 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 10, 102 Stat. 
2853, 2860 (doubling the minimum and maximum range). 
 28 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774 (increasing minimum and maximum range by fifty 
percent). 
 29 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 30 Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(1). 
 31 Although the statutes offer more explicit guidance in considering such factors when 
deciding certain questions of liability, such as in fair use, those considerations are not 
explicitly referenced for use as guidelines after infringement has been found. 
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These features stand in contrast to the Copyright Act of 1909, 
which contained an extremely complex statutory damages 
provision.32  Essentially, the 1909 Act provided for a basic range 
 32 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 101(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (amended by 
Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 652, 661 (1947)) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
101(b)), reprinted in CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 272 (7th ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter Copyright Act of 1909].  In relevant part, this read: 
[I]n lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court 
shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, 
in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in case 
of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such 
damages shall not exceed the sum of $200 nor be less than the sum of 
$50, and in the case of the infringement of an undramatized or 
nondramatic work by means of motion pictures, where the infringer 
shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that such 
infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages 
shall not exceed the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement 
of a copyrighted dramatic or dramatico-musical work by a maker of 
motion pictures and his agencies for distribution thereof to exhibitors, 
where such infringer shows that he was not aware that he was 
infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could not 
reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of such damages 
recoverable by the copyright proprietor from such infringing maker 
and his agencies for the distribution to exhibitors of such infringing 
motion picture shall not exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than 
$250, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of 
$5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as 
a penalty. But the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the 
copyright proprietor of any other remedy given him under this law, 
nor shall the limitation as to the amount of recovery apply to 
infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant, either 
by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon 
him. 
First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, $10 for every 
infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the 
infringer or his agents or employees; 
Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title, 
except a painting, statue, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy 
made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his 
agents or employees; 
Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every 
infringing delivery; 
Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or 
orchestral composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every 
subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical 
compositions $10 for every infringing performance. 
Id. 
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of between $250 and $5000, which could be adjusted upwards by a 
court.33  Significantly, though, the statute provides also particular 
guidelines for certain specific infringements. 
Within the slightly smaller range of the 1909 Act, each 
infringing copy made would increase the amount of the statutory 
damages, up to the maximum of $5,000.34  The amount of the 
multipliers would also depend upon the type of work infringed: for 
paintings, statutes, and sculptures, $10 were assessed for each copy 
made.35  For lectures, sermons, or addresses, $50 were assessed for 
each infringing delivery.36  Infringing dramatic, orchestral, or 
choral productions would result in $100 for the first infringing 
performance and $50 for each performance subsequent; other 
musical works would be liable for $10 per infringing 
performance.37  Other works would create liability at $1 per 
infringing copy.38 
Though criticized (likely rightly) for its impenetrability,39 the 
statutory damages provision of the 1909 Act contained degrees of 
guidance and subtlety that are absent from the current statute. 
Within its mandated maximum and minimum range, courts had a 
rough guide to account for the variations in the number of 
infringing copies produced.  Courts also had some statutory 
guidance in dealing with particular types of infringers: newspapers 
infringing a photograph could only be liable for $50 to $200; 
certain innocent infringements made specifically in motion 
pictures were capped at $100.40 
The variety and specificity of these provisions may have 
complicated calculations, but their presence also created specific, 
bright-line caps for particular types of infringers and 
 33 Id. 
 34 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:154 (2007). 
 35 Copyright Act of 1909. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 34 (“Section 101(b) of the 1909 Act was one of the 
many failures of that Act.  In addition to confusion over whether statutory damages were 
awardable under section 101(b) only when actual damages or defendant’s profits were 
unascertainable, section 101(b) presented a baffling smorgasbord of provisions . . .”). 
 40 Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 32. 
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infringements.  Today’s statute provides no such guidance 
alongside its range, which has increased both proportionately and 
numerically. 
If that wide range is meant to encompass a range of infringing 
copies from one to up to thousands, as well as infringements of 
large and small scale alike, perhaps a set of guidelines could be 
crafted so that various instances of infringement could be 
consistently, predictably, and fairly placed within that scale.  In 
addition to adjusting for easily quantifiable factors like the number 
of copies produced, or the amount of work infringed, a court might 
also be advised to account for the “depth” of the infringement—to 
what extent the protectable, creative content embodied in the work 
was at the heart of the value sought by the infringer.  Such 
guidelines need not be a mechanical formula that must be applied; 
however, they could provide a useful benchmark, with additional 
adjustments available at the fact finder’s discretion. 
Accounting for such context-dependent factors would not be 
new to copyright litigation—such open-ended considerations are 
part and parcel of making decisions on liability, so they may well 
have a place in the remedies phase as well.  The contours of the 
rights held by copyright owners and users are themselves highly 
context-dependent, varying from situation to situation depending 
upon the types of works, identities of the parties, and the particular 
uses made of the works.41 
Allowing for some flexibility and discretion would seem to be 
necessary—the current situation, in which statutory damages are 
collapsed into three broad categories, may be a recognition of the 
impossibility of accounting for all of the possible relevant factors.  
Ultimately a decision will be based upon the facts of a particular 
case—and a court would be the best determiner of how those facts 
 41 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 115 (2006).  Each alter the basic rights held by 
copyright holders depending upon context. Libraries, certain business establishment 
owners, and sound recording artists are all specifically entitled to particular uses in 
certain situations. See also Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on its Head? The 
Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 
1807–09 (2007) (“These bundles of entitlements vary greatly with context, depending on 
the parties involved, their relationship, and the resource at issue. . . .  [T]he Copyright Act 
is the epitome of context-specific entitlements.”). 
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should affect the penalties.  Nonetheless, statutory guidance might 
be particularly helpful in an area where a jury or judge is faced 
with such a wealth of a range. 
Such guidance might also have the role of clarifying the 
purpose behind statutory damages, preventing not only troublingly 
disproportionate awards, but also immunizing the provisions 
against constitutional challenges.  A lack of proportionality is at 
the heart of a number of challenges to application of section 504, 
rooted in the theory that the size and discretionary range of the 
damages available deny a defendant of substantive due process, in 
the same way that disproportionate punitive damages do.42 
Without taking a position on the merits of the constitutional 
argument, it is worth noting that, at least for the Thomas jury, the 
availability of higher statutory damages seemed to serve a punitive 
purpose.43  According to at least one juror, a reason for the size of 
the damages was related to Thomas’s apparent lack of credibility 
in her defense of mistaken identity.44  A set of guidelines that 
garnered a value attributable to specific aspects of findings of 
infringement might be better insulated against constitutionality 
challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Much ado is being made of the “making available” question 
because it affected the specific outcome of the Thomas and the 
specific tactics that have been used—that have been easy to use—
by plaintiffs.  No matter how it is decided, there are workarounds 
for the types of stakeholders involved in the Thomas trial.  Even if 
distribution is construed as making available, sharers and software 
developers can evade this particular avenue of enforcement by 
 42 See, e.g., Brief of Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaims, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 03-CV-11661-NG (D. Mass. Oct. 
27, 2008) (originally docketed Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 1:07-cv-
11446-NG); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against 
Illegal File-Sharing: the Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages 
for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004). 
 43 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 44 See David Kravets, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to Send a Message’, WIRED, Oct. 9, 
2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html. 
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altering their behavior (e.g., using closed networks, or physical 
media “sneakernet” transfers).45  And if distribution is held to 
require actual transfer, plaintiffs could still have file sharers on the 
hook for distributions to investigators, probable-by-a-
preponderance-of-evidence showing of actual distribution, or 
infringement of reproduction rights. 
On the other hand, statutory damages and their unpredictability 
will be a factor not only in many file sharing cases, but every 
single copyright infringement case in which a plaintiff does not 
elect actual damages.  Even beyond the impact upon litigation, the 
chilling effects of a large negative outcome can pressure early 
settlement before the merits can be decided at trial, whether the 
defendant is a single file sharer, a large newspaper publisher, or a 
cable company.  A fresh look at the consequences of the available 
range, and a more predictable and nuanced accounting of the 
awarded values, could be valuable in ensuring that they serve their 
intended purpose. 
 
 45 A sneakernet transfer describes the transfer of data from one machine to another by 
physically moving a tape, disk, or some other removable media. Paul Boutin, Sneakernet 
Redux: Walk Your Data, WIRED, Aug. 26, 2002, http://www.wired.com/culture/ 
lifestyle/news/2002/08/54739. 
